American Counter-Jihad Triumphs We Never See

American Counter-Jihad Triumphs We Never See

What the average citizen does not understand is that for every thwarted Jihadist attack reported, there are many others that we will never hear about thanks to the due diligence of our law enforcement, military and intelligence communities.

Sadly, media reports about Islamic Jihadist attacks thwarted here in the United States are not rare.  What the average citizen does not understand is that for every thwarted Jihadist attack reported, there are many others that we will never hear about thanks to the due diligence of our law enforcement, military and intelligence communities.  Former U.S. Attorney General Michael Mukasey highlights this fact in the Wall Street Journal even as he condemns the Obama administration’s failure to acknowledge the threat posed by Islamists. (block quotes credit Passing the Intelligence Test WSJ 4/3/13)  

The current administration has loosed a cataract of disclosures about how this nation tried to protect itself after 9/11, even as it resolutely refuses to recognize that it is the ideology of Islamism that we are trying to protect ourselves against.

Paradoxically, these stories and leaks have been long on provocation and short on any appreciation of the most critical component of our defense against terrorism: intelligence gathering.

Philip Mudd played a large role in that world, spending 24 years as an intelligence analyst at the CIA and FBI. He was part of the small team sent to aid anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan in the days after 9/11 and then, in January 2002, was appointed second-in-command of the CIA’s new Office of Terrorism Analysis, the division of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) where hundreds of analysts were assembled to gather information about al Qaeda.

Mr. Mudd’s memoir, “Takedown,” is a detailed account of the actual activities of intelligence gathering.

The measure of success here wasn’t simply terrorism prosecutions brought or disasters averted. Often, plots had to be dismantled by prosecuting terrorists for immigration violations and marriage fraud or by simply frustrating their ability to get the material they needed.

Consider that last sentence again.

Often, plots had to be dismantled by prosecuting terrorists for immigration violations and marriage fraud or by simply frustrating their ability to get the material they needed.

Thus, there are reasons the United States Government may choose not to prove that a terrorist is a terrorist. It may be due to a legal evidentiary  issue or a covert intelligence-gathering tactical consideration.  Therefore, we prosecute them for the crime we are comfortable exposing in court.

Islamic apologists and appeasers will argue “That’s just not right.  If you cannot prove they are terrorists, why prosecute them for a crime you would otherwise ignore?”  Well, why not prosecute them for another crime if it disrupts terrorist activity and aids the Government in protecting “proprietary” intelligence gathering methods?  Recall that gangster Al Capone, despite all his deadly activities, was eventually convicted on “mere” tax evasion charges.  It worked for the United States then and it works equally well against Islamic terrorism now.

Remember this point the next time you see CAIR (Council on American Islamic Relations) protesting the “persecution” of a Muslim for what appears to be a minor criminal infraction.  There may very well be more to the story.

To see my other Counter-Jihad posts, click “jihad” under the share buttons.

3 thoughts on “American Counter-Jihad Triumphs We Never See

  1. Excellent point. CAIR should be the first organization investigated. I am not a lawyer but I do know many Islamists believe they are above any law laid down by men. I would be willing to bet there are some discrepancies within their financial records.

  2. All we need to do is NOT ALLOW anyone who spent their formative years in a known Islamist problem area into the country. We don’t need them and they don’t need to come here. We simply do NOT need them and we don’t even need to give a reason. Just don’t let them in!

    • that might be one solution, draconion as it sound, some may draw allussions to our japanese internement camps which I think we can all agree were ineffective? And what of the “Malala Yousafzai”-like persons trying to fight the Jihadi culture from within? google her. thanks much for your comments, I really apreciate contributions like this that help flesh out the discussion, help us decide what we need to do…

Leave a Reply