FORT HOOD REPORT DIGESTED (Aulaqi) (Pt. 3)

FORT HOOD REPORT DIGESTED (Aulaqi) (Pt. 3)

This is the 3rd in a series of articles digesting the Fort Hood report.  To start with the 1stone go here.

“The FBI’s Investigation of Anwar al-Aulaqi”

This portion of the Fort Hood report is heavily redacted to protect sensitive FBI investigative techniques.

Aulaqi Timeline

April 21, 1971 Born in New Mexico

1979- 1980 Attends primary and secondary school in yemen

1994 Bachelors Degree in Civil Engineering from Colorodo State University

December 1995 – 2000 serves as iman at Mosque in San Diego, California

January 2001 – April 2002 iman at Mosque in Virginia

2001/2002? FBI opens Aulaqi investigation reason redacted

March 2002 moves to England

May 2003 FBI closes Aulaqi investigation for lack of evidence suggesting international terrorism

January 2006 FBI reopens Aulaqi investigation reason redacted

Reviewing Aulaqi’s Rhetoric & Influence

Aulaqi is a prime example of a radicalization leader; a charismatic iman.  However, his rhetoric increasingly includes public statements and exhortations of violence against the U.S.

During the two years preceding this report, Aulaqi may have inspired or played a role in encouraging at least four known “homegrown” U.S. radicals who took or attempted violent acts or training.  For each of the four, the connection with Alaqi was virtual.  The FBI has no evidence that Aulaqi instructed any of these individuals to engage in violent acts.

By 2008, Aulaqi establishes an international reputation as a popular English-speaking Islamic cleric with a prolific output of writings, sermons and audio recordings as well as a website devoted to his teachings and anti-Western views.  He appears to understand legal limitations.  He was not known directly to have instructed anyone contacting him via the website to engage in violent action.

Through December 17, 2008, the date of Hasan’s first message to Aulaqi, the FBI reviewed 12,799 electronic documents; approximately 1,420 per month or 65 to 70 per work day.  [While this area of the report is heavily redacted, it appears all of these documents are directly related to the on-going Aulaqi “review”.  Thus, the FBI workload as to reviewing these documents and determining which are potential evidence of illegality is crushing.]

Significantly, the Aulaqi investigation occasionally serves as a “trip wire” for identifying persons of potential interest for additional investigation.

Next “FBI’s Assessment of Nidal Malik Hassan”

 

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